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xtending from roughly the end of the Second World War to the collapse 
of the Soviet empire in 1989-1991, the Cold War period witnessed – 
among other upheavals – significant conflicts in East Asia and the Middle 
East, the end of European colonial empires in Africa and Asia, and a 
remarkable competition between the United States and the Soviet Union 
across virtually every aspect of endeavor, from economic and cultural 
activities to military, nuclear, and space capabilities. In this era of great 
instability scores of new states gained their independence, some great 
powers lost stature and influence in comparative terms, and millions of 
people perished in civil and interstate wars and at the hands of repressive 
governments.  
Yet it was during this period that the phrase “strategic stability” 
gained currency both as an objective and as an apt way of describing four 
dominant features of the period. First, the United States and the Soviet 
Union never went to war, although there were several occasions when 
some observers saw war as a genuine possibility, including the Berlin and 
Cuban crises, the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and the “war scare” of the early 
1980s. Second, neither these powers nor any others detonated nuclear 
weapons to inflict damage on an enemy, though they relied on them for 
deterrence, alliance cohesion, and other purposes. Third, the configuration 
of political alignments in Europe and Northeast Asia was remarkably stable 
from the mid-1950s to the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991. Fourth, the 
proliferation of nuclear-weapon states was contained to a much lower level 
than feared by some observers in the 1950s and 1960s. 
This paper concentrates on the first of the four elements of strategic 
stability in the Cold War listed above – the fact that the two superpowers 
did not engage in a direct “hot war” with each other. It raises the question, 
to what extent did U.S. analytical models concerning “crisis stability,” “first-
strike stability,” and “arms race stability” – and policies based on these 
models – contribute to the avoidance of war between the United States and 
the Soviet Union? These models assumed that Soviet and U.S. decision-
makers had, or would in time adopt, similar deterrence policies and force 
structures, and that these parallel approaches would provide for strategic 
stability in the bilateral relationship. Despite the radical simplification of 
reality in these models, many U.S. analysts and policy-makers attached 
great importance to them, and relied on them as a key element in decisions 
about the strategic force structure and doctrine of the United States. 
However, in light of Soviet and U.S. behavior at the time and in view of 
what has subsequently been learned about Soviet policies and decision-
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making, the proponents of these models appear to have overestimated 
their utility.  
The expression “strategic stability” is still widely used to signify the 
objective of avoiding major-power war. It may therefore be useful to 
critically examine the cogency and relevance of these U.S. models from the 







and fear of nuclear war 
t is not totally clear what prevented the U.S.-Soviet stalemate from 
erupting into a catastrophic world war. While important documentary and 
interview sources have become available since the end of the Cold War, 
the historical record is far from complete; and, even if it were more 
extensive, the full picture would probably remain elusive. The basic 
asymmetry in publicly available documentary evidence persists. Reliable 
material concerning the United States is much more accessible than that 
regarding the Soviet Union. With the principal exception of the Kataev 
archive of Soviet documents at Stanford University, which few scholars 
have closely examined, the main primary sources consist of the archives of 
the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations (which comprise by definition only the 
documents that the Soviet government chose to distribute), plus memoirs 
and oral history interviews. Even if supported by historical documents, 
memoirs can be self-serving; and the problems of bias and inaccurate 
memory with oral history can be even greater. As Mark Kramer has noted, 
the absence of publicly available Soviet documentation rules out “critical 
oral history.” 
On the Soviet side… the ability to cross-check and verify the 
recollections of former officials is impossible… Until Western 
scholars get access to documents that will corroborate the 
claims of Soviet oral history participants, the best we can do is 
speculate, as we have in the past, about Soviet motives and 
actions in events like the Cuban missile crisis.1
This paper hypothesizes that two overlapping basic factors 
contributed substantially to the avoidance of a direct armed conflict 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. First, these two 
superpowers enjoyed political and military preeminence in relation to their 
rivals, allies, security partners, and neutral and nonaligned states. Second, 
they both had a profound fear of nuclear war. Despite the political ambitions 
expressed by both superpowers throughout the Cold War, as well as their 
risk-taking in crises, their essential orientation was cautious and directed 
toward the avoidance of nuclear war, especially after the 1962 Cuban 
missile crisis. This led to a de facto respect for each other’s sphere of 
political influence, particularly in the most sensitive regions of confrontation 
– Europe and Northeast Asia.  
 
                                            
1 Mark Kramer, “Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral 
History?”, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 214, 216. 
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The simple fact of the preeminence of the United States and the 
Soviet Union in military power and strategic resources in relation to other 
states during the Cold War period helps to explain their avoidance of a 
general war. While there were many wars and political upheavals, including 
“proxy” conflicts with superpower involvement, political leaders in Moscow 
and Washington were for the most part afraid of events getting out of hand 
and leading to a nuclear war. Wars between smaller powers were 
numerous during the Cold War, and U.S. and Soviet forces fought in 
various conflicts – above all, the Korean and Vietnam wars for the United 
States, and Afghanistan for the Soviet Union. However, there could be no 
general war without the direct participation of both superpowers. As the 
British historian Martin Wight assessed the situation in 1972, “These two 
Powers stand to their respective allies, not as Castlereagh’s England stood 
to the other Powers of the grand alliance against Napoleon, but as the 
Roman Republic stood to the Hellenistic monarchies from the mid-second 
century B.C.”2
Scholars have advanced various theories to explain how and to 
what extent the United States and the Soviet Union came to prize and 
institutionalize measures supporting strategic stability – in the sense of war 
avoidance – during the Cold War. Alexander George and others have, for 
example, written about a learning process in which Moscow and 
Washington developed communications channels such as the “hot line,” 
agreements on dealing with incidents at sea and elsewhere, and “rules of 
the road” about acceptable boundaries for behavior in crises.
 The weakness of potential rivals to the Soviet Union and the 
United States – particularly China – was probably a source of strategic 
stability during the Cold War. Some of Mao Zedong’s policies, such as the 
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, gravely weakened China 
and slowed its economic development and therefore protracted U.S.-Soviet 
bipolarity.  
3
The contribution of the SALT and START negotiations to U.S.-
Soviet strategic stability and war-avoidance is more debatable. Avis Bohlen 
determined that the negotiations process did not provide all the strategic 
stability benefits sought by the United States, but that its ultimate political 
contribution was positive. “It did not end or even slow the arms race, either 
quantitatively or qualitatively… It is sometimes claimed that it helped to 
stabilize relationships between the two superpowers, but this claim does 
not really withstand scrutiny.” Indeed, the negotiations revealed that the 
United States and the Soviet Union did not agree on a concept of strategic 
stability to embody in treaty provisions. As Bohlen observed, despite 
 It can also 
be argued that the USSR and the United States promoted strategic stability 
when they adopted principles of prudent management of nuclear forces, 
such as personnel reliability programs, robust command and control 
systems, and safety and security measures. 
                                            
2 Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power and International Order”, in Alan James 
(ed.), The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honour of C.A.W. Manning, 
London, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 114-115. 
3 Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin (eds.), U.S.-Soviet 
Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1988. 
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adhering to the ABM Treaty, “the Soviets never really bought into MAD 
[mutual assured destruction], at least in the sense it was understood by 
American strategists.” Bohlen nonetheless concluded that the negotiations 
had positive political consequences, such as “reassuring… publics,” 
reducing “nuclear anxiety,” and providing “a modicum of transparency and 
predictability.”4
The behavior and declarations of U.S. and Soviet leaders suggest 
strongly that the risks of highly destructive nuclear operations contributed to 
the prevention of major-power war and hence underpinned a form of 
strategic stability. The stalemate did not rule out fears of coercion in crises. 
Influential U.S. experts such as Paul Nitze argued in the late 1970s that the 
Soviet Union’s superiority in intercontinental counterforce strike capabilities 
and other types of forces might enable it to exert escalation dominance in a 
confrontation with the United States.
 
5
In the early to mid-1980s, George Shultz and other U.S. and allied 
officials publicly suggested that Soviet nuclear strength could grant Moscow 
a measure of assurance in risk-taking.
 
6
Both sides became increasingly cautious about risk-taking that 
could lead to direct hostilities, particularly after they came to the brink of 
nuclear war in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. As Khrushchev wrote, 
 The Soviets did not, however, 
behave as recklessly or aggressively as Nitze, Shultz, and other Western 
observers feared that they might; and this seems to have been mainly 
because of the Soviet determination to avoid nuclear war. 
[i]n our estimation the Americans were trying to frighten us, but 
they were no less scared than we were of atomic war. We 
hadn’t had time to deliver all our shipments to Cuba, but we had 
installed enough missiles already to destroy New York, 
Chicago, and the other huge industrial cities, not to mention a 
little village like Washington. I don’t think America had ever 
faced such a real threat of destruction as at that moment. The 
Americans knew that if Russian blood were shed in Cuba, 
American blood would surely be shed in Germany. You’d have 
                                            
4 Avis Bohlen, “Arms Control in the Cold War”, Footnotes: The Newsletter of the 
Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Wachman Center, Vol. 14, No. 7, 
May 2009, available at: http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1407.200905.bohlen.armscont
rolcoldwar.html. 
5 Paul H. Nitze, “Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente”, Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 54, No. 2, January 1976; and Paul H. Nitze, “The Relationship of Strategic and 
Theater Nuclear Forces”, International Security, Vol. 2, No. 2, Autumn 1977. 
6 George Shultz, Modernizing U.S. Strategic Forces, Current Policy, No. 480, 
Washington, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 20 April 1983, 
p. 2: “My concern is that the growth of Soviet strategic power can… have an 
important effect on the Soviets’ willingness to run risks in a regional conflict or 
crisis… If the Soviets can strike effectively at our land-based ICBMs while our land-
based deterrent does not have comparable capability, the Soviets might believe 
that they have a significant advantage in a crucial dimension of the strategic 
balance; they could seek to gain political leverage by a threat of nuclear blackmail.” 
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thought that war was inevitable. But both sides showed that if 
the desire to avoid war is strong enough, even the most 
pressing dispute can be solved by compromise.7
There is solid evidence that Soviet as well as U.S. leaders feared 
nuclear war. In 1992 General Colonel Andrian Danilevich described an 
exercise in 1972 in which the General Staff presented the results of an 
analysis of a hypothetical U.S. attack against the USSR: 
 
Brezhnev and Kosygin were visibly terrified by what they 
heard… Brezhnev was actually provided a button in the 
exercise and was to “push the button” at the appropriate time. 
Marshal Grechko was standing next to him and I next to 
Marshal Grechko. When the time came to push the button, 
Brezhnev was visibly shaken and pale and his hand trembled 
and he asked Grechko several times for assurances that the 
action would not have any real-world consequences. “Andrei 
Antonovich, are you sure this is just an exercise?”8
Some key Soviet leaders in the early 1980s formed a mistaken 
impression that the United States and its allies might be preparing to attack 
the USSR. The Soviet fears arose during the same period – the late 1970s 
and early 1980s – that some U.S. experts and officials were anxious about 
a “window of vulnerability” to a hypothetical Soviet “first strike” against U.S. 
ICBMs. 
 
The gravity of the “war scare” of the early 1980s must, however, be 
put in perspective. As Gordon Barrass noted about the incident that has 
often been cited as the point of maximum peril, the NATO Able Archer 
exercise in November 1983: “At dawn on November 11, the command post 
for Able Archer signaled the order for nuclear missiles to be launched 
against targets in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Soviet Military 
Intelligence did not flinch, because they knew they were monitoring an 
exercise.”9
The Soviet leadership had to contend with the atrophy of faith in 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, widespread social demoralization, the frustrations 
of the non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union, and the restiveness of 
the Warsaw Pact allies. The Soviet leadership became more risk-averse 
and inward looking, and often found its hands full with maintaining internal 
 In other words, while the Soviets were closely monitoring the 
activities of NATO (and NATO nations) during a period of heightened 
tension, they understood what was happening and they were not on the 
verge of undertaking a preemptive nuclear attack.  
                                            
7 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, translated and edited by Strobe 
Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1970, pp. 496, 499-500. 
8 Danilevich quoted in John G. Hines (senior author), Ellis Mishulovich, and John F. 
Shull, Soviet Intentions 1965-1985, Vol. II: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial 
Evidence, McLean, The BDM Corporation, 22 September 1995, p. 27. 
9 Gordon S. Barrass, The Great Cold War: A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 301. 
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political order and its alliance system. Some clients (such as Cuba, North 
Korea, and Vietnam) probably constituted a net burden on the Soviet 
economy. By the 1980s this was the case with Moscow’s Warsaw Pact 
allies in Eastern Europe as well. As simple regime-maintenance and 
sustaining the USSR’s position in the competition with the United States 
and its allies became greater challenges for the Soviet leadership, 
undertaking a conflict that might lead to nuclear war became even less 
plausible. Soviet leaders were increasingly preoccupied in the 1980s with 







American theories of stability 
during the Cold War 
uring the 1960s some U.S. analysts and policy-makers went beyond 
the basic and widely endorsed strategic stability argument that the 
development of secure second-strike capabilities would be prudent, given 
the risk that a high level of reliance on vulnerable forces might invite a 
disarming surprise attack or attract preventive strikes in a crisis.10
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his colleagues in the 
1960s devised theories of “assured destruction” as a force-sizing tool – a 
means to ensure that Washington would have enough nuclear forces “to 
deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies by 
maintaining at all times a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an 
unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor, or combination of 
aggressors – even after absorbing a surprise first strike.”
 They 
posited strategic stability models that would, they maintained, diminish 
possible incentives to strike first in a crisis (“first strike stability,” often 
regarded as virtually synonymous with “crisis stability”) and remove 
incentives to invest in strategic defenses or additional offensive strike 
forces (“arms race stability”). The origins of such strategic stability models 
appear to reside in the concept of “assured destruction.” 
11
After careful study and debate, it was McNamara’s judgment, 
accepted by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and not 
disputed by the Congress, that the ability to destroy in 
retaliation 20 to 25 percent of the Soviet population and 50 
percent of its industrial capacity was sufficient. Such a level of 
destruction would certainly represent intolerable punishment to 
any modern industrialized nation.
 How was 
“unacceptable” damage defined? According to Alain Enthoven and Wayne 
Smith, who played leading roles in defining this policy in the Department of 
Defense:  
12
                                            
10 Albert Wohlstetter gave classic expression to this argument in his article, “The 
Delicate Balance of Terror”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2, January 1959. 
 
11 Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the 
Defense Program 1961-1969, New York, Harper and Row, 1971, p. 174. Enthoven 
served under McNamara as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems 
Analysis. 
12 Ibid., p. 175. 
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Having decided what would deter the United States, Enthoven and 
Smith projected this definition of deterrence requirements onto the Soviet 
Union and formulated a model of strategic stability through the sustained 
mutual vulnerability of the U.S. and Soviet populations to nuclear attack:  
[I]f deterrence is also the Soviets’ objective (as the available 
evidence has consistently and strongly suggested), we would 
expect them to react in much the same way to any effort on our 
part to reduce the effectiveness of their deterrent (or assured-
destruction) capability against us… This “action-reaction” 
phenomenon is central to all strategic force planning issues as 
well as to any theory of an arms race.13
Abstract models of strategic stability built on “assured destruction” 
(AD) assumptions gained influential supporters in the United States during 
the 1960s and subsequent decades. As William Van Cleave has observed, 
 
Originally only one of several analytical tests to aid judgment on 
the adequacy of forces, AD became the principal criterion, then 
the dominant strategic concept of the American defense 
community, and finally a philosophical base for theories of 
mutual deterrence, strategic stability, and strategic arms 
limitation… The corollary to this presumed “action-reaction” 
determinism was inaction-inaction. If the US were to refrain 
from challenging a Soviet AD capability, the Soviets would be 
satisfied and would have no need to build up their forces 
further.14
The concept of “assured destruction,” which soon transmuted into a 
strategic stability model of “mutual assured destruction,” had a potent and 
enduring effect on U.S. policy-making. According to Thomas Wolfe, 
“Although amended criteria for strategic force size and design began to be 
advanced in 1974 after James R. Schlesinger became secretary of 
defense…, it seems fair to say that throughout SALT I and at least the first 
part of SALT II the mutual assured destruction concept formed the central 
axis of consensus for the making of major strategic posture and arms 
control decisions in the United States.”
 
15
Reducing the United States and the Soviet Union 
to equivalent abstractions 
 Indeed, this concept of strategic 
stability influenced the thinking of some U.S. analysts and policy-makers 
throughout the rest of the Cold War. 
As Michael Nacht has pointed out, the “assured destruction”-based concept 
of strategic stability reduced the United States and the Soviet Union to two 
                                            
13 Ibid., pp. 175-176. 
14 William R. Van Cleave, “The US Strategic Triad”, in Ray Bonds (ed.), The US 
War Machine, New York, Crown Publishers, 1978, pp. 61-62. 
15 Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience, Cambridge, Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1979, p. 108. 
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“A and B” abstractions.16
Two conditions, operating together, might in a crisis create 
pressure to strike first: (1) the perception by the leader of 
Country A of the likelihood that Country B will launch a first 
strike if he waits and (2) the extent to which the expected 
(potential) cost to Country A associated with going second 
exceeds its cost of going first. Country B would simultaneously 
weigh these two factors... If the leader of Country A perceived 
that Country B was tempted to strike first, he would feel 
pressured to strike first to avoid the worse consequence of 
going second. The leader of Country B would then feel 
pressured to strike first so as to exploit the opportunity while it 
still existed. Under these circumstances, first-strike instability 
could arise in a crisis when either country perceived the other 
as being tempted to strike first… If, in contrast, both sides 
possessed highly survivable strategic offensive forces and if 
strategic defensive forces were not really effective, large 
numbers of U.S. and Soviet weapons could survive the other’s 
first strike and penetrate to enemy targets in retaliation.
 Nacht’s account is not a caricature, but a truthful 
report of the approach taken by many U.S. analysts from the late 1960s to 
the late 1980s. In 1988, for example, three Rand Corporation experts 
analyzed “conditions of first-strike stability and instability” and presented the 
following propositions: 
17
The dominant prescription was to seek “first-strike stability” by 
acquiring highly survivable second-strike forces suited to attacking the 
other side’s population while eschewing capabilities that might limit damage 
to one’s own society. “Arms race stability” was expected to obtain when 
neither side had a motive to build up its offensive strike forces, owing to a 
low level of authorized strategic defenses.  
 
Capabilities that might limit damage by destroying the other side’s 
forces before they could be launched, such as highly accurate ICBMs and 
SLBMs with MIRVed warheads, were stigmatized by many U.S. observers 
as “destabilizing.” SLBMs were seen as stabilizing because they provided a 
secure second-strike capability. Many U.S. commentators deplored the 
pursuit of ballistic missile defenses intended to offer protection to U.S. 
society against ICBMs and SLBMs as “destabilizing.” 
In order to uphold this model of strategic stability requirements, the 
United States at times exercised restraint in making accuracy 
improvements. In 1970, John Foster, then Director of Defense Research 
and Engineering in the Department of Defense, testified that he had 
deliberately cancelled research that might have made U.S. MIRVs more 
                                            
16 Michael Nacht, “The Politics: How Did We Get Here?”, Washington Quarterly, 
Vol. 23, No. 3, Summer 2000, p. 88. 
17 Glenn A. Kent, Randall J. DeValk, and David E. Thaler, A Calculus of First-Strike 
Stability (A Criterion for Evaluating Strategic Forces), N-2526-AF, Santa Monica, 
Rand Corporation, June 1988, p. 3. 
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accurate and thus better suited to holding Soviet ICBM silos and other 
hardened targets at risk. “My purpose was to make it absolutely clear to the 
Congress and, hopefully, to the Soviet Union, that it is not the policy of the 
United States to deny the Soviet Union their deterrent capability.”18
As Harold Brown, then Secretary of Defense, put it in 1979, “In the 
interests of stability, we avoid the capability of eliminating the other side’s 
deterrent, insofar as we might be able to do so. In short, we must be quite 
willing – as we have been for some time – to accept the principle of mutual 
deterrence, and design our defense posture in light of that principle.”
 
19
Strategic stability models based on mutual vulnerability were 
attractive to many U.S. analysts and policy-makers for multiple reasons. 
Aside from the financial savings derived from foregoing damage-limiting 
capabilities, the models were elegant, simple, and reassuring. They spared 
U.S. analysts the trouble of doing empirical research about specific 
countries, and enabled them to focus on a factor – force structures – that 
could be observed and subjected to mathematical analysis. Abstract game 
theory models seem to have appealed to U.S. analysts with professional 
backgrounds in economics or mathematics. 
 
The United States attempted through arms control negotiations and 
other means to persuade the Soviet leadership to embrace the logic of 
stability through mutual vulnerability but had little success in this endeavor. 
Moscow accepted the ABM Treaty in 1972 and agreed to amend it in 1974 
(reducing the number of treaty-authorized sites for strategic ABM 
interceptor complexes from two to one), but the Soviet Union continued to 
invest much more than the United States in strategic defenses, active and 
passive. 
Soviet and U.S. behavior demonstrated that the two superpowers 
were not simply countries “A” and “B.” A strong strain in U.S. thinking 
argued for a cooperative U.S.-Soviet effort to construct similar postures that 
would, according to U.S. analytical models, support strategic stability. In 
contrast, the dominant view in the Soviet government and military saw 
instability as deriving fundamentally from political factors rather than force 
structures. As Kerry Kartchner has noted, “Instability, in the traditional 
Soviet view, is primarily a function of the inherent hostility and political 
tensions between different types of social systems, or classes of states.”20
                                            
18 Foster testimony on 4 June 1970 in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, 
ABM, MIRV, SALT, and the Nuclear Arms Race, Hearing, 91st Congress, 2nd 
Session, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, p. 509. 
  
19 Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1980 
Budget, FY 1981 Authorization Request and FY 1980-1984 Defense Programs, 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 61. 
20 Kerry M. Kartchner, Negotiating START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the 
Quest for Strategic Stability, New Brunswick and London, Transaction Publishers, 
1992, pp. 8-9. 
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In strategic arms control negotiations the Soviets made clear their 
interest in preserving certain unilateral advantages, particularly in ICBM-
based counterforce capabilities. According to Thomas Wolfe, the SALT 
negotiations from 1969 to 1979 revealed  
the lack of a common conception of strategic stability and of 
what might be required to preserve it… Although the Soviets 
could be judged sensitive to the survivability issues as it 
concerned their own forces, they apparently again [in SALT II], 
as in SALT I, could not be moved to agree that mutual 
survivability of offensive forces would be good for the security of 
both parties.21
The same pattern persisted in the START negotiations from 1982 to 
1991. As a result, in Kartchner’s words, “The net effect has been to 
preserve and protect a position of Soviet dominance in those counterforce 
weapons best suited for preemptive disarming attacks.”
 
22
Simple models, complex realities of competition 
  
While many American strategic analysts in the 1960s and 1970s were 
preoccupied with devising doctrines of strategic stability through mutual 
vulnerability, Soviet political and military leaders did not accept U.S. 
theories of stability via “mutual assured destruction” capabilities as 
guidance for their own force development and strategic planning. According 
to perhaps the most authoritative and comprehensive study of the U.S.–
Soviet strategic arms competition, the once highly classified analysis 
conducted for the U.S. government by Ernest May, John Steinbruner and 
Thomas Wolfe, 
Though the United States and the Soviet Union both came to 
conceive of strategic forces as having the function of war 
prevention, their views concerning these forces continued to be 
different, the U.S. emphasizing manifestation of capability for 
inflicting unacceptable damage on an adversary’s homeland, 
the Soviets emphasizing manifestation of capability for fighting 
a war… The Soviets… appear to have had a different 
approach, the essence of which was that the better the armed 
forces were prepared to fight a nuclear war, and the society to 
survive its effects, and the more clearly the adversary 
understood this, the more he would be effectively deterred… 
[T]he equation of effective deterrence with war fighting 
capability made the Soviet leadership continuously unreceptive 
to the doctrine of “mutual assured destruction.23
                                            
21 Wolfe, The SALT Experience, op. cit., pp. 106-107; emphasis in the original.  
  
22 Kartchner, Negotiating START, op. cit., p. 283. 
23 Ernest R. May, John D. Steinbruner, and Thomas W. Wolfe, History of the 
Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972, edited by Alfred Goldberg, Washington, 
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Rather than endorsing a concept of mutual vulnerability, Soviet 
leaders sought to reduce their state’s vulnerability to nuclear coercion and 
to minimize their losses in the event of conflict by pursuing damage-limiting 
capabilities – hard-target-kill counterforce capabilities that U.S. 
assessments deemed considerably more potent than those of the United 
States, plus strategic defenses much more extensive than their U.S. 
counterparts, including air defenses, civil defenses, and deep underground 
shelters for leadership cadres. 
The damage-limiting capabilities probably did not give the Soviets 
much confidence that they could avoid catastrophic losses in the event of a 
nuclear war with the United States. As David Holloway observed, the 
Soviets “have tried to prepare for nuclear war, and they would try to win 
such a war if it came to that. But there is little evidence to suggest that they 
think victory in a global nuclear war would be anything other than 
catastrophic.”24
While both the Soviet Union and the United States sought 
deterrence and the prevention of nuclear war, they took a different 
approach in their preparations for the contingency of deterrence failure. 
During the decade from 1972 (the conclusion of the ABM Treaty) to 1983 
(President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative speech) the Soviet Union 
probably invested much more in strategic defense capabilities (including air 
defenses and passive defenses as well as missile defenses) than did the 
United States, and continued its high levels of visible investment in 
strategic defense capabilities such as air defenses into the late 1980s. 
Assessing the cost of these investments with any precision is, however, 
difficult. The Soviets did not publish financial data with regard to military 
spending; such information was kept highly secret. The information about 
Soviet military spending that has subsequently become available is 
incomplete, and the authenticity and reliability of some sources is in 
question. A more fundamental problem regarding data on Soviet military 
spending is that the Soviet economy was a centralized command economy.  
 Indeed, the catastrophic nature of nuclear war was a theme 
in Soviet military doctrine from the late 1960s to the end of the USSR in 
1991.  
U.S. government “dollar cost” estimates suggested only what it 
might have cost the United States to build and operate specific Soviet 
capabilities. In 1975, for example, the Director of the CIA testified that,  
As for strategic defense forces, the ABM and similar systems, 
the U.S.S.R. has traditionally maintained much larger ones than 
the United States… The cumulative dollar costs of Soviet 
programs over the 1964-1974 period are four times U.S. 
spending, the biggest difference being in SAM [surface-to-air 
missile] and fighter-interceptor programs. In 1974, the dollar 
                                                                                                               
Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 1981, pp. 819-820; 
emphasis in the original. 
24 David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1983, p. 179. 
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costs of Soviet strategic defense programs amount to almost 
eight times U.S. expenditures for strategic defense.25
The only type of strategic defense capability subject to treaty 
constraints during the Cold War was ballistic missile defense, restricted by 
the 1972 ABM Treaty. It is noteworthy that the initial Soviet reactions to 
U.S. offers to negotiate constraints on ballistic missile defenses, as 
articulated by Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin in 1967, were negative. As 
Aleksandr’ Savel’yev and Nikolay Detinov have noted, in the 1960s 
 
notions such as “strategic stability,” “nuclear deterrence,” and 
so on, were, at that time, still foreign to the Soviet leadership... 
Soviet strategic offensive arms of all classes, as well as its ABM 
system, fully conformed to the then prevailing Soviet military 
doctrine which aimed at winning a nuclear war... Similarly, when 
the SALT I talks were subsequently opened with the United 
States in November of 1969, the issue of strengthening 
strategic stability was not one that formed a cornerstone of the 
Soviet position.26
The Soviet decision to approve treaty constraints on BMD 
deployments and associated activities seems to have formed gradually as 
three considerations came into clearer focus at that time: the disappointing 
performance of Soviet BMD systems, the superior technical prospects of 
U.S. BMD programs, and the continuing domestic political survival of U.S. 
BMD programs. The Soviet leadership appears to have endorsed the ABM 
Treaty mainly as a means to discourage the United States from investing in 
missile defense while the Soviet Union carried forward its research and 
development efforts in missile defense, continued investing in other forms 
of strategic defense, and expanded its offensive strike capabilities.  
  
Evidence for the thesis that the Soviets accepted the ABM Treaty as 
a means to uphold a theory of strategic stability based on agreed mutual 
vulnerability is limited and open to debate.27
                                            
25 Testimony of William E. Colby, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 18 June 
1975, in Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China – 1975, Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint 
Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 94th Congress, 1st session, 
Part 1, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 30. 
 For example, the conclusions 
presented by Aleksandr’ Savel’yev and Nikolay Detinov on the Soviet 
decision to accept the ABM Treaty proposed by the United States are not 
entirely consistent. In one passage they emphasized disappointment with 
Soviet BMD technology as a more important factor than American “strategic 
26 Aleksandr’ G. Savel’yev and Nikolay N. Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Control 
Decision-Making in the Soviet Union, trans. by Dmitriy Trenin and ed. by Gregory 
Varhall, Westport, Praeger Publishers, 1995, pp. 2, 3, 7; italics in the original. 
27 David S. Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1988, pp. 88-102 and passim. 
 
D. Yost / Strategic stability in the Cold War 
 - 22 - 
stability” arguments, while in another they highlighted these arguments as a 
decisive consideration.28
According to William Odom’s report of his interview exchanges with 
Detinov, “The U.S. proposal for an ABM treaty... came as a pleasant 
surprise. By ending the U.S. ABM program, it would free the Soviets from 
engaging in simultaneous competition in both strategic offensive and 
defensive systems and permit Soviet ICBM programs to move ahead on 
schedule.” Odom wrote that Detinov held that “the logic of U.S. views on... 
how to achieve strategic ‘stability’ played no role at all in the Soviet 
acceptance of the ABM treaty.”
  
29
While the extent to which U.S. strategic stability theories may have 
influenced the Soviet decision to accept the ABM Treaty is less than 
entirely clear, the treaty plainly enabled the Soviets to avoid an expensive 
competition in a domain of U.S. technological advantage. By relieving the 
Soviets of a resource dilemma, the ABM Treaty allowed them to invest 
more in other capabilities, including ICBMs. The counterforce capabilities 
resident in their ICBM force might enable them to achieve greater damage-
limiting results than might be available through Soviet missile defenses.  
  
In short, the Soviet political-military leadership appears to have 
rejected the “mutual assured destruction” reasoning advanced by Robert 
McNamara and his followers as the desirable foundation of strategic 
stability, including “crisis stability” and “arms race stability.” As John Hines 
and his colleagues found in interviews with former senior Soviet military 
officers and civilian officials, 
Soviet strategists recognized that deterrence was, to some 
extent, mutual, because each side was capable of launching a 
retaliatory strike and of inflicting unacceptable damage on the 
other. They, nevertheless, considered their nuclear power the 
only guarantee of security from war, and they never examined 
the question of mutually assured destruction as a condition they 
should accept, much less pursue… They rejected the 
desirability of mutual vulnerability, so they attempted to acquire 
the capacity to limit damage.30
Moreover, according to these interviews, the Soviets did not accept 
the assumption – popularized in U.S. expert and official circles by 
McNamara and his followers – that strategic stability should be based on 
“parity,” an equivalence in intercontinental offensive and defensive 
capabilities. Instead of being satisfied with the “parity” that U.S. officials and 
  
                                            
28 Savel’yev and Detinov, The Big Five, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
29 William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, New Haven and London, 
Yale University Press, 1998, p. 71. 
30 John G. Hines (senior author), Ellis Mishulovich, and John F. Shull, Soviet 
Intentions 1965-1985, Vol. I: An Analytical Comparison of U.S.-Soviet 
Assessments During the Cold War, McLean, The BDM Corporation, 22 September 
1995, pp. 16-17, 21. 
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experts saw the Soviet Union gaining in the late 1960s, a “parity” ostensibly 
codified in the 1972 SALT treaties, Moscow appears to have seen Soviet 
superiority as the proper basis for stability. From the perspective of highly 
placed Soviet officers and officials, the balance with the United States was 
not as stable as many of their U.S. counterparts assumed; and in their view 
Soviet superiority would have a stabilizing effect that would enhance the 
USSR’s security. 31
Soviet behavior in the 1970s gave many American observers the 
impression that the USSR was seeking superiority. This behavior did not 
conform to U.S. “arms race stability” theories holding that minimizing 
strategic missile defenses through the ABM Treaty would remove 
incentives to build offensive strike forces and to invest in non-ABM forms of 
strategic defense. As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown observed in 
1979,  
 
Unfortunately, longer-term stability is not fully assured, and the 
future competition in strategic capabilities is likely to become 
more dynamic than need be the case... [T]he main impulse for 
this dynamism comes from the Soviet Union in the form of a 
large ICBM force with an expanding hard-target-kill capability, a 
much publicized civil defense effort, and the likelihood of 
significantly upgraded air defense capabilities… More 
troublesome is the degree of emphasis in Soviet military 
doctrine on a war-winning nuclear capability, and the extent to 
which current Soviet programs are related to the doctrine.32
In other words, the “arms race stability” and “strategic stability” 
theories that had led the United States to propose the SALT I agreements, 
including the ABM Treaty, failed to account for Soviet behavior. This failure 
was one of the factors (among others, including the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan) that convinced the Carter Administration of the need to 
support a significant increase in defense spending and improvements in the 
survivability of U.S. strategic nuclear forces – a policy direction continued in 
the early 1980s by the Reagan Administration.  
 
Moreover, the Soviets frequently tested the ABM Treaty’s 
boundaries, and this led to numerous compliance disputes. In 1989 the 
                                            
31 “Soviet strategists considered the nuclear balance to be unstable, because 
technological advances and increases in the size of the arsenal could significantly 
augment the power of one side relative to the other, thereby upsetting the 
balance... The Soviets felt that the only truly stable nuclear situation was one in 
which one side had clear superiority over the other. To be both secure and stable, 
the imbalance had to be in the Soviets’ favor. Therefore, throughout this period the 
Soviets attempted to gain strategic superiority over the U.S., with the primary goal 
not of ensuring victory in a nuclear war (which the informed military leadership 
considered unattainable in any meaningful sense), but of enhancing their general 
security, to include the security of Soviet influence in Europe and around the 
globe.” Hines et al., Soviet Intentions 1965-1985, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 1. 
32 Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1980 
Budget, op. cit., pp. 79-80. 
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Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, admitted, as Washington 
had long charged, that the USSR’s Krasnoyarsk radar was constructed in 
violation of the ABM Treaty.33
The “action-reaction” model of the arms competition failed to 
account for Soviet behavior because it disregarded the autonomy of Soviet 
decision-making. Vojtech Mastny has in this regard emphasized the 
“ideological preconceptions” of Soviet decision-makers and their confidence 
in “the supposedly ‘scientific’ nature of Soviet policy” as factors in this 
autonomy in relation to U.S. choices.
 Many American officials and experts had 
asserted in the early 1970s that the 1972 ABM Treaty would stabilize the 
arms competition by removing any incentive for the Soviet Union to expand 
its ICBM forces, because the strict limits on U.S. BMD deployments would 
leave the population of the United States vulnerable to Soviet attack. 
However, Soviet force procurement did not conform to mainstream U.S. 
expectations. The Soviet Union dramatically increased its ICBM capabilities 
in the 1970s.  
34
John Hines and his colleagues also found considerable autonomy in 
Soviet arms competition behavior. However, they attributed the Soviet 
unresponsiveness to U.S. force posture decisions not to Communist 
ideological principles, but to internal bureaucratic factors and the power 
accumulated by key personalities in the organizational structure.
 
35
The complex mix of causative factors within the USSR appears to 
have included personalities and bureaucratic imperatives as well as 
ideology and strategy, and to have been somewhat insulated from the 
effect of U.S. activities. The autonomy of Soviet policy was long ago 
evident to scholars who looked beyond the “action-reaction” model to 
empirical evidence. In 1974-1975 Albert Wohlstetter demonstrated in a 
series of studies the inadequacy of simple “action-reaction” models of U.S.-
Soviet competition in strategic nuclear capabilities.
 
36
The U.S. and Soviet force postures were not mirror-image replicas 
of each other. The United States, for example, maintained a larger 
intercontinental bomber force than the Soviet Union from the late 1950s to 
the end of the Cold War, while Moscow invested more than Washington in 
  
                                            
33 Eduard A. Shevardnadze quoted in Bill Keller, “Radar a ‘Violation,’” New York 
Times, 24 October 1989, p. A1. 
34 Vojtech Mastny, “Imagining War in Europe: Soviet Strategic Planning”, in Vojtech 
Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), War Plans and Alliances 
in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West, London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006, p. 28. 
35 Hines et al., Soviet Intentions 1965-1985, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 49, 71. 
36 Albert Wohlstetter, “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?”, Foreign Policy, No. 15, 
Summer 1974; “Rivals, But No ‘Race’”, Foreign Policy, No. 16, Fall 1974; and 
“Optimal Ways to Confuse Ourselves”, Foreign Policy, No. 20, Fall 1975. See also: 
Andrew W. Marshall, “Arms Competitions: The Status of Analysis,” in Uwe Nerlich 
(ed.), The Western Panacea: Constraining Soviet Power through Negotiation, 
Vol. 2 of Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Policies, Cambridge, Ballinger 
Publishing Company, 1983, pp. 3, 7. 
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high throw-weight ICBMs, with larger numbers of warheads, from the late 
1960s to the end of the Cold War. The United States effectively abandoned 
civil and air defenses in the 1960s. 
The United States developed capabilities, articulated declaratory 
strategies, and undertook planning and targeting beyond the requirements 
of the “assured destruction” criteria defined by McNamara and his 
colleagues in the late 1960s. While Washington invested much less than 
Moscow in strategic defenses, particularly prior to the initiation of the SDI, 
the United States developed counterforce capabilities and options for 
limited nuclear strikes. Indeed, even McNamara saw merits in developing 
options for limited nuclear operations. The landmarks in the Cold War 
development of U.S. declaratory and operational policy complementing and 
looking beyond stability based on U.S.-Soviet mutual vulnerability included 
McNamara’s “counterforce” or “no cities” strategy in 1961-1962, Secretary 
of Defense James Schlesinger’s quest for “options” and “escalation control” 
in 1974, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s “countervailing strategy” in 
1980, and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s interest in 
preparedness for potential “protracted” nuclear conflict in 1982.  
Moreover, on at least some occasions, the United States attempted 
to pursue a “competitive strategies” approach. This approach included 
efforts to exploit the Soviet tendency to invest heavily in strategic defenses, 
including air defenses, and thereby limit the amount of resources available 
to the Soviets for spending on offensive strike forces. It is not clear why the 
Soviets continued to sustain their costly air defense effort despite 
Washington’s confidence in the U.S. ability to defeat and penetrate Soviet 
air defenses. Accepting their vulnerability would have been consistent with 
first-strike stability models. The Soviets were, however, evidently trying to 
diminish their vulnerability to U.S. (and third-party) bomber aircraft.  
A related problem with “first-strike stability” theory is that its 
proponents assumed that, to quote Glenn Kent and David Thaler, “The 
United States and the Soviet Union share the national security objective of 
first-strike stability, and maintaining it requires joint efforts and cooperation. 
Because first-strike stability is a shared goal, each country should spend its 
resources to make its own strategic nuclear forces invulnerable, rather than 
to make the other’s strategic nuclear forces vulnerable.”37
By this logic, both the Soviet Union and the United States should 
have seen the merits of building strategic nuclear force postures with 
similar characteristics. This was, however, clearly not the case during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, when the Soviet Union dramatically exceeded 
U.S. expectations in the construction of accurate high-throw-weight ICBMs 
capable of threatening a substantial proportion of U.S. strategic nuclear 
forces. As Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin wrote in 2006, “In the Soviet 
Union in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the strategic nuclear force 
  
                                            
37 Glenn A. Kent and David E. Thaler, First-Strike Stability: A Methodology for 
Evaluating Strategic Forces, R-3765, Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, August 
1989, pp. 47-48. 
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corresponded more closely to the model of forces for war fighting (about 70 
percent of warheads were on silo-based ICBMs with MIRVs), although at 
the political level deterrence was placed at the forefront.”38
The Soviets behaved with greater restraint in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s than Paul Nitze and other U.S. “window of vulnerability” 
theorists feared that they might. However, the Soviets did not reason and 
behave as U.S. “first-strike stability” theorists assumed. The differences in 
outlook became clear in U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, 
including the last major treaty concluded before the Soviet Union collapsed. 
As Kerry Kartchner has shown in his analysis of the negotiating record, the 
START treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in July 
1991 represented a compromise between contrasting concepts of stability. 
 
Both sides in START endorsed improving stability as a general 
goal, but could not agree on what stability means... For the 
Soviets, strategic stability in military terms depends heavily on 
preserving counterforce dominance, and is a function of their 
confidence in achieving wartime objectives. For example, the 
Soviets argued in START that SS-18s are actually stabilizing 
because their counterforce potential discourages prospective 
adversaries from exploiting crises in which those adversaries 
might otherwise be tempted to attack the Soviet Union. On the 
other hand, the United States considers the SS-18 to be the 
most destabilizing weapon in existence because it is capable of 
disarming first-strike attacks, yet is itself vulnerable to such 
attacks and must therefore be launched preemptively... 
Furthermore, the very weapons the United States claimed were 
stabilizing (cruise missiles, bombers, and sea-launched ballistic 
missiles) were denounced by the Soviets as destabilizing.39
John Hines and his colleagues reached similar conclusions on the 
basis of interviews with former Soviet officials. 
  
Nor did the Soviets build weapons principally with the aim of 
maintaining a stable strategic balance, because they 
considered the strategic competition to be inherently unstable 
and dynamic. They did, however, build weapons that credibly 
could and would be used in the event nuclear war actually were 
to occur. In this sense, the ability to fight a war was an integral 
part of the Soviet deterrence strategy, despite the fact that the 
leadership was not sanguine about the possibility of a 
meaningful victory, nor even of the survival of a Soviet state.40
                                            
38 Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Transforming 
the U.S.-Russian Equation, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2006, p. 22. 
 
39 Kartchner, Negotiating START, pp. 277, 279; italics in the original. 
40 Hines et al., Soviet Intentions 1965-1985, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 3. 
 
D. Yost / Strategic stability in the Cold War 
 - 27 - 
It was not until 1989, near the end of the Cold War, that the United 
States and allied governments began to grasp the magnitude of Soviet 
biological weapons (BW) programs. The United States had decided that 
biological and toxin weapons were unnecessary and had no military value 
in comparison with nuclear weapons, and President Nixon had terminated 
U.S. BW programs in 1969. Despite the fact that the USSR would pursue 
biological weapons until the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union joined 
with the United States and other countries to conclude the 1972 Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which entered into force in 1975.  
It was evidently in that same year that – in covert violation of the 
BTWC – the Soviet Union began to vastly expand its long-standing BW 
programs. These programs “grew to employ tens of thousands of workers 
and received the equivalent of hundreds of millions of dollars in funding.” 
The Soviets worked on weaponizing plague, anthrax, smallpox, and other 
agents, and constructed huge production facilities for these agents. The 
Soviets also worked on “genetically altered viruses and germ weapons to 
devastate crops and livestock,” including “plant pathogens intended to wipe 
out the entire American wheat supply.”41
While many unanswered questions remain regarding Soviet 
biological weapons activities (for instance, whether – or to what extent – 
reliable cruise and ballistic missile delivery systems were developed), it is 
clear that Soviet BW efforts were far more extensive than imagined in the 
United States. The massive Soviet BW programs were hardly a sign of 
similarity in U.S. and Soviet thinking about how to achieve strategic 
stability. The possibility that the Soviets might engage in strategic-scale BW 
operations was not taken into account in the theories of strategic stability 
propounded by American analysts during the Cold War. 
  
Another important Soviet effort that was not encompassed by U.S. 
conceptions of strategic stability was the USSR’s development of a semi-
automatic command and control system for its strategic nuclear forces. 
While the Soviets considered a “Dead Hand” concept for a fully automated 
nuclear retaliatory system, they rejected it. They instead constructed a 
semi-automatic system called Perimetr which provided for a pre-delegation 
of launch authority in the presence of certain criteria, including evidence of 
a large number of nuclear detonations against certain targets. However, the 
Perimetr system had no deterrent value during the Cold War because the 
Soviet authorities kept its existence secret.  
Misrepresenting the likely causes of war 
The mutual vulnerability model that was supposed to simultaneously 
provide “crisis stability,” “first strike stability,” and “arms race stability” was 
alluring and elegant, but based on false premises about a supposed 
similarity of doctrine and capabilities of the two antagonists and about how 
                                            
41 David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms 
Race and Its Dangerous Legacy, New York, Doubleday, 2009, pp. 132, 134, and 
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decisions are made to go to war – as if force posture characteristics were 
the decisive factor.  
The superpowers and the rest of the world did not, for example, 
survive the Cuban missile crisis owing to a similarity in U.S. and Soviet 
force posture characteristics. According to one analysis, the United States 
had “at least nine times as many deliverable nuclear warheads” as the 
Soviet Union at the time of the crisis, to say nothing of its superiority in 
ICBMs and SLBMs.42
While President Kennedy was aware of U.S. superiority in 
survivable nuclear strike systems, he was preoccupied with the grave risks 
in any nuclear war, and tried to avoid confrontation. Rather than taking the 
decisive military action that some advisers had recommended, he ordered 
what he termed “a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment 
under shipment to Cuba.”
 The U.S. government had for at least a year been 
aware of the fact that the “missile gap” fears deliberately fostered by the 
Soviet Union in the late 1950s were unfounded, at least as far as ICBMs 
were concerned.  
43 Calling the U.S. naval action during the Cuban 
missile crisis a “quarantine” instead of a “blockade” was in itself significant, 
because a blockade would have been an act of war. According to Robert F. 
Kennedy, President Kennedy “reminded” congressional leaders “that once 
an attack began our adversaries could respond with a missile barrage from 
which many millions of Americans would be killed. That was a gamble he 
was not willing to take until he had finally and forcefully exhausted all other 
possibilities.”44 President Kennedy was deeply impressed by Barbara 
Tuchman’s book The Guns of August,45 an account of the miscalculations 
and emotional choices that contributed to the outbreak of World War I. 
President Kennedy told his brother, “I am not going to push the Russians 
an inch beyond what is necessary.”46
Moscow and Washington appear not to have gone to war in other 
Cold War crises because of fear that any direct clash could lead to nuclear 
war, not because of shared commitment to a theory of “crisis stability” 
through parity and similar force postures based on survivable second-strike 
forces and the avoidance of strategic defenses and hard-target-kill 
counterforce capabilities.  
 
In other words, the contribution of force posture characteristics to 
strategic stability in U.S.-Soviet relations was probably secondary to that of 
political factors. Each side’s maintenance of secure second-strike forces 
                                            
42 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Spy vs. Spy: The KGB vs. the CIA, 1960-1962”, in 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History 
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43 President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American 
People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, 22 October 1962, available at 
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44 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, New 
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46 Kennedy, Thirteen Days, op. cit., p. 127. 
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may have contributed to stability from the late 1960s to the end of the Cold 
War, however. 
Disregarding the role of individual personalities  
in strategic decision-making 
As suggested above, the Cuban missile crisis illustrated the pivotal role of 
individual personalities in decision-making. The Soviet and U.S. leaders 
made choices designed to enable them to disengage from the confrontation 
without an armed conflict that could have readily led to nuclear war. 
In the United States, the role of powerful personalities such as 
Robert McNamara, who served as Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 
1968, in shaping the U.S. strategic force posture has long been apparent. 
Studies of primary documentary sources from Warsaw Pact 
archives have underscored the critical roles played by specific Soviet 
leaders during the Cold War. As Vojtech Mastny has pointed out, 
The close dependence of policy on the personalities of the 
supreme leaders, documented by new evidence, made Soviet 
management of military power less predictable than suggested 
by the image of the Cold War’s bipolar stability. Stalin’s reputed 
realism and sense of caution did not prevent him from imposing 
the Berlin blockade and sanctioning the aggression in Korea – 
blunders that gave the Cold War the military dimension it had 
originally lacked. Khrushchev’s restless drive for innovation and 
desire to demilitarize the conflict did not prevent him from 
achieving the opposite effect, leading to the Cold War’s most 
dangerous crises over Berlin and Cuba. And Brezhnev, though 
more averse to risk than either of his predecessors, tolerated 
out of weakness and corruption excessive militarization of 
Soviet power, which was wrought with unprecedented 
dangers.47
The interviews conducted by John Hines and his colleagues also 
indicate that “Personalities were as important, if not more important, than 
institutional or bureaucratic competition in determining Soviet military and 
force-building policy and clearly played a more immediate and decisive role 
than did expert analysis.”
 
48 The examples cited include Marshal Andrei 
Grechko, the Minister of Defense in 1967-1976, and Mstislav Keldysh, 
President of the Academy of Sciences, 1961-1975.49
The central role of personalities in key choices about how to 
conduct the strategic competition – as well as how to prepare for war and 
 
                                            
47 Vojtech Mastny, “Introduction: New Perspectives on the Cold War Alliances”, in 
Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), War Plans and 
Alliances in the Cold War, op. cit., p. 3. 
48 Hines et al., Soviet Intentions 1965-1985, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 7. 
49 Hines et al., Soviet Intentions 1965-1985, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 53-56. 
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manage crises – casts doubt on the accuracy of analyses that presume that 
Soviet and U.S. leaders were guided by “first strike stability” or “arms race 
stability” models. 
An increasingly multipolar configuration of nuclear powers 
Another major shortcoming of the “first strike stability” models favored by 
some U.S. analysts and policy-makers during the Cold War was their 
radical simplification of the strategic world to two powers, during an era 
when complex multipolar configurations of nuclear weapons states were 
emerging.  
As early as the 1960s, U.S. officials expressed concern about how 
future Chinese nuclear capabilities could affect the U.S.-Soviet relationship. 
For example, if China used nuclear weapons against the United States, the 
United States would be weakened and still facing an undamaged Soviet 
Union. In 1969, U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird advanced this as 
an argument for the proposed U.S. missile defense system known as 
Safeguard.50
During the late 1970s high-level French officials drew attention to 
France’s ability to affect the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. The idea was 
that French strikes against the Soviet Union could put Moscow in a highly 
inferior and vulnerable position in relation to the United States, and that this 
ought to have an effect on Soviet thinking and thereby contribute to 
deterrence. In 1977 General Guy Méry, then the Chief of Staff of the Armed 
Forces, declared that the “damage that we could cause to either 
superpower would immediately place it in such a situation of imbalance 
regarding the other superpower that it is doubtful that either could afford to 
tolerate suffering that damage at any time.”
 
51 In the same year Prime 
Minister Raymond Barre referred to the “decisive disequilibrium” that 
France could bring about in the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear balance as a 
deterrent.52
The British government in 1980 also expressed interest in assessing 
its nuclear deterrence requirements in the context of how the United 
Kingdom could affect the U.S.-Soviet relationship: “Indeed, one practical 
approach to judging how much deterrent power Britain needs is to consider 
what type and scale of damage Soviet leaders might think likely to leave 
them critically handicapped afterwards in continuing confrontation with a 
relatively unscathed United States.”
  
53
                                            
50 U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, testimony before the House 
Appropriations Committee, Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, 91st Congress, 
1st session, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1969, pp. 59-60. 
 
51 Guy Méry, “Conférence”, Défense, No. 9, May 1977, p. 19. 
52 Raymond Barre, “Discours prononcé au Camp de Mailly le 18 juin 1977”, 
Défense Nationale, August-September 1977, p. 12. 
53 The Future United Kingdom Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Force, London, Ministry 
of Defence, July 1980, p. 5. 
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Soviet concern about third nuclear powers was apparent in 
Moscow’s persistent efforts to include British and French forces in the U.S.-
Soviet arms control negotiations. Soviet demands for compensation 
extended at times beyond Britain and France to China.54
The United States was initially critical of the French nuclear 
weapons program. In the early 1960s Secretary of Defense McNamara 
made clear his concern that French nuclear forces could complicate U.S. 
control over a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. McNamara 
declared that “limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are 
dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as 
a deterrent.”
 Soviet leaders 
also made clear their concern about the possible role of third powers when 
they terminated their nuclear technology assistance to China in the late 
1950s, joined with the United Kingdom and the United States in 
establishing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
in 1968, and asked the U.S. government in 1969 how Washington might 
react to a Soviet strike against Chinese nuclear assets.  
55 American officials also deplored the French nuclear project 
as a diversion of resources away from conventional forces, as prone to 
divide the Alliance, and as likely to incite further nuclear proliferation.56
 
  
By 1974, however, the United States was ready to endorse the 
Ottawa Declaration on Alliance Relations, which noted that two of the 
European Allies “possess nuclear forces capable of playing a deterrent role 
of their own contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of 
the Alliance.”57 In other words, the United States and the other NATO Allies 
held that multiple centers of nuclear decision-making could complicate an 
adversary’s risk calculations and thereby reinforce deterrence and strategic 
stability. The NATO Allies have retained the view that the British and 
French nuclear forces enhance the Alliance’s deterrence posture.58
The possible roles of third powers were, however, generally not 
taken into account in the mathematical models of “first-strike stability” and 
 
                                            
54 Savel’yev and Detinov, The Big Five, op. cit. p. 13. 
55 Robert S. McNamara, Address at the Commencement Exercises, University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 16 June 1962, quoted in William W. Kaufmann, 
The McNamara Strategy, New York,  Harper and Row, 1964, p. 117. 
56 Edward A. Kolodziej, French International Policy Under de Gaulle and 
Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 
1974, p. 108. 
57 North Atlantic Council, Declaration on Atlantic Relations, Ottawa, 19 June 1974, 
in Texts of Final Communiqués, 1949-1974, Brussels, NATO Information Service, 
1975, p. 319 (paragraph 6). 
58 “The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic 
nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the 
independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which 
have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security 
of the Allies.” North Atlantic Council, Active Engagement, Modern Defence:  
Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 19 November 2010 (paragraph 18). This statement 
repeated almost identical statements in the Alliance’s Strategic Concepts of 7 
November 1991 (paragraph 54) and 24 April 1999 (paragraph 62). 
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related concepts that were esteemed by some leading U.S. analysts and 
policy-makers during the Cold War. Moreover, the American theories of 
strategic stability prominent during the Cold War generally failed to consider 
the alliance dynamics operative on each side. The theories about 
superpowers “A” and “B” disregarded decision-making in NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact as well as the relationships that Moscow and Washington had 
with allies and security partners outside Europe.  
Moving from abstraction to reality 
In retrospect, strategic stability in U.S.-Soviet relations amounted to the 
avoidance of direct war and the successful management of crises that 
might have led to nuclear war. It did not imply a consensus on nuclear 
doctrine or on theories of “first-strike stability” or other abstract constructs 
endorsed by influential U.S. analysts. Nor did it imply an enduring formal 
agreement on spheres of influence or an abandonment of political 
ambitions on either side. The nominal stability of the Cold War period was 
far from entirely reliable, in view of the ongoing political-military competition 
and the recurrent “close calls” in confrontations that might have led to war. 
The apparent stability was nonetheless noteworthy in relation to the 
potential for violent destruction that each superpower held in reserve.  
While some observers maintain that the fact that no U.S.-Soviet 
nuclear war took place proves the robustness of the deterrence relationship 
between Washington and Moscow, it seems impossible to objectively 
assess the comparative strength or fragility of a particular bilateral 
deterrence relationship as long as there has been no recourse to combat. 
In other words, while war may demonstrate the breakdown of a deterrence 
stalemate, it is impossible to prove that an ostensibly stable deterrence 
stalemate is not at risk of erosion or even imminent collapse. The absence 
of fighting in a particular antagonistic relationship offers (a) no proof that 
deterrent threats (as opposed to other causes) are inducing restraint and 
(b) no guarantee that the restraint will continue. Efforts to deter are subject 
to multiple limits, and no firm warranties against failure are available. 
Accordingly, one must be cautious in drawing inferences and 
lessons from a single case – the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold 
War. Except for the capital virtue of successful avoidance of a major-power 
war as well as the merits of certain agreements to constrain and regulate 
the bilateral competition and influence the nuclear proliferation decisions of 
third parties, the conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War does not offer a 
particularly attractive precedent for guidance in post-Cold War conditions.  
Moreover, the abstract models favored by some U.S. analysts and 
policy-makers during the Cold War were so detached from political, 
operational, and strategic realities that their utility is severely limited. 
Indeed, their seeming objectivity and mathematical elegance could provide 
unwarranted assurance as to the robustness and reliability of the U.S. 
deterrence posture. Such models were useful only to the limited extent that 
their assumptions and parameters could capture a complex and dynamic 
reality. Such models had no predictive value, partly because they could not 
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encompass some major pertinent factors, such as personalities and the 
possible roles of third parties, as well as the potential influence of “national 
styles” and strategic cultures.59
                                            
59 This was one of the main arguments advanced by the first generation of 
“strategic culture” theorists, including Jack L. Snyder and Colin S. Gray. See, for 
example, Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture : Implications for Limited 
Nuclear Operations, R-2154-AF, Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, September 
1977; and Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, Lanham, Hamilton 
Press/Abt Books, 1986. For a perceptive discussion of specific merits and 
limitations of “strategic culture” as an analytical construct, see Christopher 
Twomey, “Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International Security”, Contemporary 








ome of the essential strategic choices that the United States and its 
allies made during the Cold War appear addressed to a bygone world 
rather than to today’s challenges. These challenges include sophisticated 
terrorist networks; the continuing proliferation of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons, usually termed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
and their delivery means, including cruise and ballistic missiles; and the risk 
of a resurgence of great power competition and confrontation. The 
international context may become more dynamic and fluid with the diffusion 
of various technologies (including advanced means of guidance, 
reconnaissance, and communications) and the possible rise of nationalistic 
and religious ideologies in adverse economic conditions. 
Many lessons could no doubt be drawn from the U.S.-Soviet 
experience, including the value of restraint and caution in crisis 
management. However, the following objectives may constitute a useful 
medium-term agenda: recognizing the limits of Cold War models, cultivating 
humility about understanding deterrence and stability, adopting a more 
empirical approach to deterrence and stability requirements, upholding 
extended deterrence despite the tension between it and U.S. strategic 
vulnerability, and increasing investments in non-nuclear operational 
capabilities. 
Recognizing the limits of Cold War strategic stability models 
If strategic stability means simply the avoidance of major-power war, it is 
doubtful whether any model based mainly on the force structure 
characteristics of the potential antagonists can provide conclusive insights. 
In principle, force structure matters: for example, other things being equal, 
secure second-strike forces might well be more “stabilizing” in a crisis than 
lucrative and vulnerable targets, such as silo-based MIRVed ICBMs. 
However, the parallel force structures advocated by U.S. theorists during 
the Cold War might not be a sufficient condition for strategic stability, given 
the other factors that could influence decision-making. The U.S.-Soviet 
case suggests that strategic stability involves important factors other than 
particular force structure characteristics. As with deterrence efforts, there 
are no guarantees in the quest for stability; and probability judgments are 
the most that can be offered regarding attempts to promote stability. 
The models of “crisis stability” and “arms race stability” favored in 
the United States from the 1960s on were inadequate guides for policy 
during the Cold War era in which they were formulated, and they are not 
likely to be more relevant in current and foreseeable circumstances. 
S 
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However, some proponents of such theories may argue that they could 
furnish a basis for future U.S. relations with China. They may contend that 
the U.S. acceptance of rough parity with the Soviet Union, which some 
Americans rationalized on the basis of their theories of the requirements of 
strategic stability, offers a precedent that might be applied to managing the 
rise of China. Such an approach would rely on an abstract model of 
strategic stability through mutual vulnerability and would disregard political, 
cultural, geographical, and other differences that could make the 
acceptance of rough parity with China dangerous for the United States and 
its allies. While strategic stability in the sense of avoiding war between 
China and the United States is obviously a desirable goal, the proper 
foundations and mechanisms of strategic stability in U.S.-Chinese relations 
must be defined with care. 
One of the problems with the phrase “strategic stability” is that it can 
be (and has often been) employed to convey the misleading impression 
that there is an agreed and enduring consensus on its requirements. It is 
important to be aware of the risk that the phrase may therefore be used as 
an instrument of political struggle, as it was during the Cold War. 
Proponents of particular policies may garb their proposals in dignified and 
positive “stabilizing” trappings and attack disfavored policies as somehow 
inconsistent with strategic stability.  
In July 2010, Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, 
expressed concern about “the totality of factors that could erode strategic 
stability,” including “the prospect of weapons in outer space, plans for the 
creation of non-nuclear strategic missile systems, the unilateral strategic 
missile defense buildup, and the growing imbalance in conventional 
weapons.”60
Such concepts of what could “erode strategic stability” might lead to 
the reestablishment of political or even legal constraints on missile 
defenses and drastically constrain the ability of the United States to 
develop such defenses against regional powers. Moreover, the Russian 
approach could hinder the United States and its allies in developing other 
capabilities that could help to ensure their national security and promote 
global strategic stability. The Russians appear to be interested in exploiting 
a concept of stability through mutual vulnerability for which their Soviet 
predecessors had little use in their operational strategy during the Cold 
War. It is therefore important to strive for clarity in thinking and discourse 
about strategic stability and associated ideas and to examine critically the 
practical implications of the concepts advanced as a basis for action. 
  
The abstract strategic stability models favored in the United States 
during the Cold War are plainly irrelevant in confrontations with zealots bent 
                                            
60 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, “The New START Treaty in the Global Security 
Matrix: The Political Dimension”, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 7, July 2010, 
available at: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/2
5909cfe1bbd1c6ec325777500339245?OpenDocument (accessed 30 December 
2010). 
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on personal martyrdom or otherwise disconnected from the cost-benefit 
calculus associated with theories of deterrence based on a threat of 
punishment. For this reason it appears that “deterrence by denial” 
measures – that is, threatening operational defeat – may offer better 
prospects for success than threatening punishment in conflicts with 
religious fanatics.  
It is not clear whether or to what extent fanatical state regimes may 
be subject to deterrence. In Michael Rühle’s judgment, “Once religious 
fundamentalism is factored into the nuclear equation (witness the debate 
about a ‘Talibanisation’ of Pakistan), the chances of erecting a stable, long-
term mutual deterrence regime in a multinuclear world appear slim 
indeed.”61 This observation raises questions that deserve further analysis. It 
can be argued that once a revolutionary regime has a territory it has 
something to lose and therefore a motive for at least a measure of restraint, 
as the examples of Communist China and North Korea suggest. In other 
words, cases may differ. As Joseph Pilat has observed, terrorist 
organizations “have historically mimicked states in key areas and are thus 
subject to constraints and influences of various kinds.”62
The major Asian powers – in particular, China, India, Japan, and 
Russia – are likely to shape conditions for global strategic stability to an 
increasing extent. As Brad Roberts has observed, “Asia is now the most 
nuclearized of all continents,” with three main possible sources of 
instability: the “unpredictability” of Asia’s major powers, the potential 
“intensification of competition,” and “the unique role of the United States in 
the region as an extender of deterrence and assurance.” Owing to 
America’s unique role, 
 This might be all 
the more the case if a terrorist group gained control of a state, but the 
reliability of deterrence measures could not be guaranteed. 
A sudden loss of confidence in the United States as a security 
guarantor would have far-reaching implications as states 
respond by creating deterrents of their own – or more advanced 
hedging strategies... The objectives of U.S. policy should flow 
from these potential sources of instability. Policy should seek to 
lend a sense of predictability of the Asian nuclear order, to 
avoid an intensification of strategic military competition, and to 
reinforce the reputation of the United States as a guardian of 
nuclear stability.63
                                            
61 Michael Rühle, “NATO’s Future Nuclear Doctrine: Factors Shaping a Decision”, 
in Mark Fitzpatrick, Alexander Nikitin, and Sergey Oznobishchev (eds.), Nuclear 
Doctrines and Strategies, Amsterdam, IOS Press, 2008, p. 60. 
 
62 Joseph F. Pilat, “Dissuasion of Terrorists and Other Non-State Actors”, Strategic 
Insights, Vol.III, Issue 10, October 2004, available at: 
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The multifaceted challenges in promoting strategic stability in Asia’s 
dynamic political environment underscore the limited relevance of the 
bipolar “first-strike stability” models of the Cold War. It is noteworthy in this 
regard that, while the April 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review report 
referred repeatedly to the importance of pursuing strategic stability in U.S.-
Russian and U.S.-Chinese relations, it did not even mention Russian-
Chinese strategic stability issues. Russia’s Vostok 2010 military exercise 
underscored, however, the continuing value that Moscow attaches to its 
nuclear forces as a bulwark of deterrence and defense for Siberia and the 
Far East. 
Cultivating humility about understanding the requirements of 
deterrence and stability 
One of the lessons of the Cold War is that the United States and its allies 
should be cautious about imagining that they understand the internal 
political dynamics of their adversaries and their military and nuclear 
strategies.  
Since the end of the Cold War, it has become apparent that the 
Soviet Union and the United States each made errors in assessing the 
other side’s capabilities and intentions. For example, it appears that each 
side may have overestimated the accuracy of the other side’s ICBMs. John 
Hines and his colleagues found that in the early 1980s Soviet estimates 
held that “greater accuracy, in combination with other factors,” had 
“increased the effective power of the U.S. nuclear arsenal by a factor of 
3.”64
U.S. estimates significantly overestimated the accuracy that 
Soviet missiles were able to demonstrate in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s... [O]nly in 1991 did the Soviet Union barely reach 
the counterforce capability that the U.S. intelligence community 
reported it had achieved a decade earlier.
 Pavel Podvig, relying on the Kataev archive of primary source 
documents regarding Soviet strategic programs, concluded that 
65
Perhaps the greatest Soviet errors (aside from the risk-taking under 
Stalin and Khrushchev) were in attributing a “first-strike” strategy to the 
United States and suspecting that Washington in the early 1980s might be 
preparing to implement this strategy. The corresponding U.S. error was 
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According to the analysis prepared by John Hines and his 
colleagues, one of the most significant U.S. errors was to attribute greater 
aggressiveness to the Soviet Union than was in fact the case, given what 
has become known since the USSR’s collapse about the true dynamics of 
Soviet policy-making and behavior. 
U.S. analysts perceived greater military planning and design 
behind the USSR’s arms buildup than probably was justified. 
Missile deployments in the 1970s, for instance, gave the 
impression to some of the most astute U.S. experts that the 
Soviet Union was developing the ability to initiate limited 
nuclear strikes, when in fact, missiles continued to roll off Soviet 
production lines largely to satisfy the interests of the defense 
industry.67
Even if the motivation behind Soviet force building was as “benign” 
as a bureaucratic-industrial establishment producing excess weapons for 
its own satisfaction, with little reference to a coherent strategic design, 
Hines and his colleagues noted, “This, of course, left the fact of the 
massive Soviet capability, regardless of its origins, as the main threat, a 
capability, which in the hands of a malevolent or irrational leadership could, 
in any case, destroy the Western world.”
 
68
U.S. analysts therefore had objective grounds for concern, for 
Soviet behavior had led to the accumulation of capabilities that could 
plausibly threaten major elements of the U.S. force structure – as well as 
holding other assets at risk. Moreover, Soviet behavior was far from 
conforming to U.S. theories of the requirements of “first-strike stability” and 
“arms race stability.” 
 
In other words, one should be wary of the notion popular in the 
United States during that era that there is a single sensible approach to 
stable nuclear deterrence that one’s adversaries will eventually recognize 
and accept. This may be an ethnocentric projection onto others of one’s 
own thinking about what ought to constitute a credible deterrent.69
It would be imprudent to suppose that the requirements of strategic 
stability have been firmly grasped, much less agreed upon, by the major 
 The 
same difficulty applies to concepts of intra-war deterrence and escalation 
control. A deliberately limited action intended to have a de-escalatory effect 
– that is, the restoration of deterrence and the cessation of combat – might 
not be interpreted by an adversary as a signal of restraint and resolve, but 
as a precursor to a mortal challenge.  
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68 Ibid., p. 69; italics in the original. 
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powers and by third parties capable of initiating conflicts that could draw in 
major powers.  
Adopting a more empirical approach to deterrence and stability 
requirements 
Perhaps the most significant lesson that the United States and its allies can 
learn from the Cold War experience follows directly from acknowledging 
that there were important errors in U.S. assessments of the Soviet Union’s 
capabilities, strategies, and intentions. These errors stemmed in part from 
successful Soviet information denial and deception efforts and in part from 
U.S. failures to comprehend or take seriously available evidence. However, 
they also derived from a focus on U.S. theoretical models of deterrence and 
stability requirements that were at times regarded as more relevant than 
empirical evidence of Soviet activities and strategic policy. Owing to faith in 
U.S.-designed models as a universal strategic wisdom that the Soviets 
would eventually accept and endorse, some U.S. experts regarded the 
Soviets as “slow learners” who, as Roman Kolkowicz put it, “lagged behind” 
the United States in learning about the doctrinal and force posture 
requirements of strategic stability.70
In retrospect, and in light of Soviet and Warsaw Pact primary 
sources that have become available since the end of the Cold War, it is 
clear that U.S. and other Western analysts failed to grasp the autonomy 
and distinctness of essential elements of Soviet strategic policy. 
 
This discovery and the recognition that the United States and its 
allies face multiple types of potential threats – from terrorist organizations 
and regional powers to major powers – have rightly led to calls for “tailored 
deterrence.” The phrase “tailored deterrence” seems to have first entered 
the official lexicon of the U.S. Department of Defense with the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review, which said that the United States must move 
away “From ‘one size fits all’ deterrence – to tailored deterrence for rogue 
powers, terrorist networks and near-peer competitors.” The 2006 QDR also 
referred to the need for “more tailorable capabilities to deter advanced 
military powers, regional WMD states, or non-state terrorists.”71
There were efforts during the Cold War to tailor the U.S. and NATO 
deterrence posture to the Soviet threat, but these efforts did not go as far 
as current judgments on the demands of tailored deterrence and they were 
influenced by models of strategic stability that dominated U.S. thinking and 
posited a universal model of deterrence requirements. “Tailored 
deterrence” calls for avoiding self-centered mirror-imaging and the 
projection of one’s own values and assumptions onto others. It requires 
detailed knowledge of particular adversaries and their strategic cultures, 
decision-making patterns, and priorities, not a priori assumptions about the 
functioning of deterrence derived from Cold War experiences.  
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Another element of a more empirical approach to strategic stability 
may be pursuing intensive, high-level, and wide-ranging dialogues with 
potential adversaries. Robert Pfaltzgraff has suggested that “a stable 
strategic relationship is one in which both sides gain knowledge about each 
other’s strategy such that they gain increased confidence that neither will 
dramatically alter the relationship, or at the very least one of the parties will 
have sufficient advance warning to be able to take corrective action.”72 This 
approach to strategic stability is consistent with the call in the April 2010 
U.S. Nuclear Posture Review report for “high-level, bilateral dialogues on 
strategic stability with both Russia and China.”73
This approach has potential pitfalls, including the risk that U.S. allies 
may develop anxieties about the possibility that Washington might neglect 
their security interests and make deals with Moscow and/or Beijing without 
consulting them. The perennial risks of deception and manipulation – and 
of misunderstanding – would also persist, as would the chance that 
Chinese or Russian representatives would simply reiterate standard 
declaratory policy at meeting after meeting. Moreover, preparations for 
demanding dialogues would oblige U.S. policy-makers to engage with 
specific issues presented by Russian and Chinese interlocutors. However, 
communicating U.S. resolve might be constructive for deterrence and 
stability, as well as reassuring to allies. At a minimum, it should be recalled 
that one of the positive results of Cold War efforts to pursue strategic 
stability was the establishment of direct “hot line” channels of 
communication between the U.S. and Soviet governments. 
  
Upholding extended deterrence 
U.S. extended deterrence commitments and alliance relationships, notably 
in NATO and with Japan and South Korea, remain relevant as a means to 
promote nonproliferation. It is in U.S. interests and in the interests of global 
political stability and war-prevention that the United States uphold the 
credibility of these commitments. In summing up the findings from a series 
of studies of countries that considered pursuing national nuclear weapons 
programs, Kurt Campbell and Robert Einhorn reached the following 
conclusion: 
The case studies suggest that the perceived reliability of U.S. 
security assurances will be a critical factor, if not the critical 
factor, in whether such countries as Japan, Saudi Arabia, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey reconsider their nuclear options.74
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There is a risk, however, that U.S. extended deterrence 
commitments may in some cases appear less necessary and/or less 
credible over time, and this could lead to decisions to pursue national 
nuclear weapons programs. In some circumstances, an increase in 
perceived threats could enhance the importance of the mechanisms 
devised during the Cold War to bolster the credibility of extended 
deterrence and assurance (including consultations and, in NATO, roles for 
European allies in hosting and/or supporting operational assets). 
To hedge against the risk of a perceived decline in the credibility of 
U.S. nuclear security commitments, the United States will have to exercise 
caution in undertaking unilateral or negotiated reductions in its nuclear 
forces. Successful dissuasion and deterrence, as well as the assurance of 
allies, may depend on retaining credible nuclear forces. Aside from the 
risks for successful nonproliferation policies, nuclear force reductions could 
present other risks for stability. Less numerous and less diversified forces 
could be more vulnerable to attack, cheating, and technological 
breakthroughs, and would provide fewer options for central and extended 
deterrence. 
Grappling with the tension between extended deterrence 
and U.S. strategic vulnerability 
Cold War experiences may also be relevant in dealing with the tension, 
visible since the late 1950s, between extended deterrence and the 
vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to nuclear attack.  
To diminish this tension, the United States and its allies will have to 
develop options other than relying on a model of strategic stability based on 
mutual vulnerability to nuclear attack. These options could include 
improved damage-limiting capabilities, such as air and missile defenses, 
and conventional strike and combat forces. It is noteworthy in this regard 
that in both the 2001 and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews, the U.S. 
government called for enhancing the credibility of deterrence through an 
increased reliance on non-nuclear capabilities.  
The credibility of extended deterrence commitments depends on 
more than capabilities, however. It is clear from the historical record that 
from the mid-1950s on Soviet leaders feared nuclear war and were 
conscious of the intrinsic risks in the U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff in Europe 
and elsewhere. Beginning in the 1950s, the United States underscored 
these risks by deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of selected allies. 
With the promulgation of the Schlesinger Doctrine in 1974, the U.S. 
government made public a capacity to employ limited nuclear options that 
was intended, among other purposes, to reinforce the credibility of 
extended deterrence. In Schlesinger’s words, “We had to persuade the 
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Russians and our European allies that extended deterrence still worked, 
even though the Soviet Union could now destroy our cities.”75
The United States enhanced the credibility of its extended 
deterrence commitments, despite its vulnerability to Soviet nuclear attack, 
by making clear to Moscow that it regarded its own national security 
interests as being at stake with those of its allies. In other words, in addition 
to facing U.S. and allied capabilities, the Soviet Union could see that 
Washington considered the security of its NATO allies to be among the vital 
interests of the United States. This helped to compensate for America’s 
vulnerability to Soviet nuclear forces and thus upheld the credibility of U.S. 
extended deterrence. The tension appeared insurmountable in abstract 
models of strategic stability, but in practice U.S. allies and adversaries 
generally regarded U.S. security commitments as credible, owing in part to 
the large U.S. military presence in Europe.
 
76
The credibility of extended deterrence commitments depends, 
among other factors, on the gravity of the interests at stake for the security 
guarantor, and not only on capability ratios and force posture 
characteristics. It appears that the United States can in some 
circumstances – despite its own nuclear vulnerability – offer effective 
extended deterrence protection by identifying its interests with those of its 
allies and demonstrating firmness in risk-taking on behalf of these allies. In 
the absence of superior U.S. damage-limiting capabilities, however, the 
risks are higher for Washington, and therefore the credibility challenge is 
greater. 
 
The tension between extended deterrence commitments and U.S. 
strategic vulnerability that arose during the Cold War in U.S.-Soviet 
relations may reappear in U.S.-Chinese relations if China continues to build 
up robust and survivable second-strike forces. In other words, China need 
not attain parity with the United States in nuclear capabilities in order to 
threaten U.S. allies and hold significant U.S. assets at risk. China’s 
expanding regional and long-range strike capabilities could complicate U.S. 
efforts to sustain the credibility of extended deterrence and assure U.S. 
allies and security partners. 
U.S. quantitative superiority in strategic forces would not, in other 
words, necessarily mean that U.S. extended deterrence would prevail. It 
might take less to deter the United States than to deter China in a specific 
contingency. Depending on the circumstances, the stakes might be higher 
in a Taiwan crisis for China than for the United States, and China’s 
willingness to run risks might be correspondingly greater than that of the 
United States.  
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U.S. analysts remain far from agreement on whether the United 
States should or can take action to avoid a Chinese-U.S. relationship of 
mutual vulnerability to nuclear attack. Robert Pfaltzgraff has set out a 
vigorous argument for taking such action: 
the conscious perpetuation of U.S. vulnerability in the mistaken 
belief that the result will be strategic stability makes no sense. It 
may even encourage China to attempt to exploit U.S. 
vulnerability at a time of crisis and lead to undesired escalation 
based on miscalculation... For the United States strategic 
stability can best be enhanced by reducing vulnerabilities, 
including a strategic nuclear posture that includes deterrence by 
denial.77
The proposal advanced by some Russian and U.S. observers of 
reviving the ABM Treaty appears to be based in part on a misreading of the 
Cold War experience. To the extent that strategic stability prevailed during 
the Cold War – above all, in the sense of avoiding a direct war between the 
United States and the Soviet Union – it appears to have resulted from the 
shared fear of nuclear war and the specific features of the major 
antagonists, not from parallel force posture characteristics conforming to 
models of “first-strike stability.” A new ABM Treaty could constrain the 
ability of the United States and its allies to deal with plausible regional 
power contingencies without contributing materially to the prevention of 
major-power conflicts. The United States and its allies and coalition 
partners may find it advantageous to invest in superior damage-limiting 
capabilities, including missile defenses, for multiple reasons: to improve the 
prospects for successful deterrence and crisis management, to sustain 
public support and alliance cohesion, and to defend their interests in 
confrontations with regional powers. 
 
Increasing investments in non-nuclear operational capabilities 
It remains in the interest of the United States and its allies to reduce their 
dependence on nuclear weapons by continuing to develop non-nuclear 
capabilities, including special operations forces and various types of 
defenses, active and passive. Damage-limiting capabilities, such as active 
and passive defenses as well as cyber defenses and precision non-nuclear 
strike assets, may enhance deterrence and constitute a hedge against the 
possible failure to deter of second-strike nuclear forces and other 
capabilities and arrangements intended to provide for deterrence and 
strategic stability.78
The nuclear element of deterrence will remain of paramount 
importance, because conventional means cannot achieve operational, 
deterrent, or political effects equivalent to those feasible with nuclear 
weapons. As Rod Lyon has observed, “Nuclear weapons, because of their 
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sheer destructiveness, speak a unique dialect of the language of 
deterrence.”79
For this reason a number of expert allied observers in Australia, 
Japan, and South Korea, as well as in NATO countries, see limits to 
lessening reliance on nuclear deterrence capabilities. Conventional forces 
cannot in the foreseeable future completely replace nuclear forces for 
deterrence, and whether they will ever be able to do so is open to debate. 
The United States and its allies are nonetheless likely to find additional 
non-nuclear capabilities – including precision strike forces and air and 
missile defenses – among the most valuable options for dealing with the 
WMD capabilities of regional powers in the event of deterrence failure. 
Capabilities for deterrence by denial – that is, threatening the adversary 
with operational defeat – can be employed, if necessary, to limit damage 
and impose defeat. 
 Indeed, aside from their destructiveness, nuclear weapons 
bear unique political and psychological significance in deterrence and 
assurance. 
Doubts about the reliability and political credibility of deterrence 
based on threats of punishment have led to (a) greater interest in 
capabilities for deterrence by denial – that is, capabilities designed to 
frustrate and defeat an enemy’s assault while minimizing collateral damage 
to the maximum extent possible – and (b) closer attention to concepts of 
anticipatory defense, including preemptive action, with regard to state as 
well as non-state adversaries. The renewed prominence of these concepts 
suggests how dramatically perceptions of international security challenges 
have changed since the end of the Cold War. Preemptive actions would 
offer ipso facto proof of the absence of strategic stability if they led to a 
clash between major powers. Non-nuclear capabilities for deterrence by 
denial could offer a means, at least in some circumstances, to diminish 
reliance on nuclear forces. 
Non-nuclear as well as nuclear capabilities will have to be adapted 
to new challenges for strategic stability in space and cyberspace. As 
Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley have noted, cyberspace and outer 
space, together with the sea and the atmosphere, constitute “the global 
commons, those areas of the world beyond the control of any one state.” 
From a U.S. national security perspective, they have added, “stability and 
security in space and cyberspace will depend on working with our allies and 
partners to develop a common framework and advance international norms 
that can shape the choices and behavior of others.”80
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he Cold War confrontation is history, but the challenges of strategic 
stability remain. The United States in its February 2010 Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review (BMDR) and its April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 
referred repeatedly to the importance of strategic stability in U.S.-Russian 
and U.S.-Chinese relations. The BMDR confirmed that U.S. “homeland 
missile defense capabilities are focused on regional actors such as Iran 
and North Korea” and that the U.S. ground-based midcourse defense 
system “does not have the capacity to cope with large scale Russian or 
Chinese missile attacks, and is not intended to affect the strategic balance 
with those countries.”81
Pending nuclear disarmament, the NPR called for the following 
measures in support of strategic stability: maintaining an assured second-
strike capability with the long-standing U.S. nuclear alert posture in order to 
ensure that any aggressor would continue to face “unacceptable costs;” 
convening “high-level, bilateral dialogues on strategic stability with both 
Russia and China;” avoiding “large disparities in nuclear capabilities” in the 
U.S.-Russia force ratio; implementing the “verification and transparency 
measures” in the New START Treaty; and pursuing the ratification and 
entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the 
negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) “with appropriate 
monitoring and verification provisions.”
 
82 While the NPR retained the 
traditional Triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, it prescribed de-
MIRVing all U.S. ICBMs to a single warhead and ensuring that proposed 
non-nuclear prompt global strike capabilities do not undermine “the stability 
of our nuclear relationships with Russia or China.”83
The new emphasis on strategic stability in relations with both Russia 
and China makes clear that the context is no longer that of the Cold War. 
The rise of China has led to concern among U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific 
region. Japanese observers in particular have expressed concern that the 
concept of U.S.-Chinese strategic stability might encourage China “to be 
more assertive and confident” and build up its nuclear arsenal to rough 
parity with the United States, as in the U.S.-Russia relationship, particularly 
in a context of U.S. and Russian nuclear force reductions. According to 
some Japanese observers, while defining strategic stability as based on 
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agreed mutual vulnerability is acceptable in U.S.-Russian relations, 
formalizing a similar definition in U.S.-Chinese relations in an arms control 
agreement could place Japan in a vulnerable position.84
National security officials in Tokyo have expressed particular 
concern that China may decide to step beyond its current 
nuclear posture of minimum deterrence and decide to develop a 
robust second-strike capability, perhaps with Japan as a 
primary target. Simultaneously, some Japanese experts worry 
that U.S. absolute supremacy in nuclear forces may erode in 
the future… The worst-case scenario for these strategic 
thinkers is that increase in Chinese capabilities and decrease in 
U.S. capabilities may lead the United States to conclude a 
bilateral arms control agreement with Beijing that endorses 
protection of a Chinese limited nuclear strike capability against 
the United States, with a decoupling effect that would be 
devastating for Japan.
 As two experts on 
Japanese perspectives recently wrote, 
85
For observers holding this judgment, the prescription of U.S.-
Chinese arms control negotiations offers no comfort. Their concerns relate 
to the factors that contribute to the overall credibility of U.S. extended 
deterrence commitments, including U.S. capabilities, vulnerabilities, and 
political will. As Stephan Frühling has noted, “Somewhat paradoxically, 
such concerns could be reinforced by US attempts to stabilize the (global) 
balance through arms control measures with the rising power, which would 




The tension between U.S. strategic vulnerability and extended 
deterrence protection to allies stood out as a recurrent issue during the 
Cold War, particularly in Europe. This tension has become more acute and 
complex as greater demands have been placed on the United States to 
uphold extended deterrence commitments to security partners that feel 
threatened by China, Russia, and/or other powers, such as Iran and North 
Korea. Some allied observers have raised questions about the capacity of 
the United States to provide extended deterrence protection to its many 
security partners in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, given the continuing 
expansion of Chinese conventional and nuclear capabilities; the 
modernization of Russian nuclear forces; and the proliferation of 
increasingly accurate and longer-range missiles and other military 
capabilities in Iran, North Korea, and other states.  
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The question of de-MIRVing ICBMs offers another illustration of 
continuity and change in U.S. efforts to promote strategic stability. The 
United States sought the de-MIRVing of ICBMs in Cold War arms control 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. U.S. analysts argued during the Cold 
War that de-MIRVed (or single-warhead) ICBMs would promote strategic 
stability because multiple warheads would be required to neutralize a 
single-warhead ICBM and because single-warhead ICBMs could not 
threaten as many targets as MIRVed ICBMs. U.S. analysts maintained that 
both Moscow and Washington should de-MIRV their ICBMs, and this is 
what the START II Treaty signed in January 1993 called for.  
This ICBM de-MIRVing requirement was, however, one of the most 
distasteful features of the ill-fated START II Treaty in Russian eyes; and it 
helps to explain why Moscow in ratifying this treaty in April-May 2000 
attached conditions that it had every reason to expect would be 
unacceptable to the United States. As a result, START II never entered into 
force.87 When START II was effectively bypassed by the May 2002 Moscow 
Treaty, the United States made clear that it had abandoned its previous 
policy about the dangers for strategic stability posed by Moscow’s MIRVed 
ICBMs. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said in July 2002, “Since 
neither the United States nor Russia has any incentive to launch nuclear 
weapons at each other, we no longer view Russian deployment of MIRVed 
ICBMs as destabilizing to our strategic relationship.”88
In the New START Treaty signed in April 2010 the Barack Obama 
administration maintained the George W. Bush administration’s acceptance 
of Russia’s reluctance to de-MIRV its ICBMs. The New START Treaty 
contains no de-MIRVing requirement or ICBM throw-weight limits, and 
Russia is at liberty to continue to MIRV its ICBMs. The April 2010 U.S. 
Nuclear Posture Review report stated, however, that “All U.S. ICBMs will be 
‘de-MIRVed’ to a single warhead each to increase stability.”
 This announcement 
illustrated how a political perspective on strategic stability may differ from 
that posited in an abstract model. 
89
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the NPR report, “This step will enhance the stability of the nuclear balance 
by reducing the incentives for either side to strike first.”90
In other words, the United States has endorsed the theory favored 
by leading U.S. analysts during the Cold War that “Single-warhead ICBMs 
contribute to stability,”
  
91 but it has implicitly recognized that Russia does not 
accept U.S. views on the force posture characteristics that would enhance 
strategic stability.92
The paradoxical result is that U.S. de-MIRVing could have a harmful 
effect on strategic stability, depending on Russia’s procurement decisions, 
according to the U.S. Cold War models that emphasized the role of force 
posture characteristics in stability assessments. The combination of U.S. 
de-MIRVing and Russian MIRVing could lead to a widening disparity in 
U.S. and Russian uploading capacity. If the Russians chose to keep up 
their warhead numbers by MIRVing a smaller number of ICBMs, the United 
States could have an advantage in uploading capacity. At the same time, 
however, according to the U.S. Cold War models, Russia – with 
comparatively lucrative targets constituted by an increasingly smaller 
number of MIRVed ICBMs – might judge that it is at risk of a U.S. disarming 
first strike, and therefore feel under pressure to launch preemptively in an 
acute crisis. According to the U.S. Cold War models, the preferred solution 
would be de-MIRVing on the Russian side, so that Moscow would not rely 
on a relatively small number of MIRVed missiles that could comprise 
attractive targets. Purchasing a large number of new ICBMs might, 
however, be beyond Russia’s means, given its financial constraints.
 This dichotomy is pertinent to the assurance of allies 
and security partners benefiting from U.S. extended deterrence protection, 
because some allied observers have raised questions about the coherence 
of U.S. policy. The single-warhead ICBM policy shows U.S. fidelity to an 
element of a Cold War U.S. model of strategic stability, but with little reason 
to expect that Russia will follow the U.S. example. 
93
The relevance of Cold War concepts of deterrence and strategic 
stability for today’s challenges deserves further critical analysis. The need 
for sound organizing concepts concerning strategic stability is clear, and 
critical thinking about the Cold War experience may be an instructive 
source of inspiration. Cold War principles of deterrence have too often, it 
seems, been either rejected or carried over into post-Cold War and post-11 
September 2001 circumstances without due consideration. Some 
principles, such as the utility for strategic stability (in the sense of 
enhancing the probability of successful deterrence and war-prevention) of 
secure second-strike capabilities, remain valid in relations among advanced 
nuclear-weapon states, although they may be of less relevance in deterring 
specific regional powers. Moreover, some principles of prudent 
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management of nuclear capabilities – personnel reliability programs, “hot 
line” and other communications systems, and various safety and security 
arrangements – may make an indirect contribution to strategic stability by 
minimizing risks of accidents, misperceptions, and unauthorized use. 
Reassessing the Cold War experience may offer further lessons – positive 
and negative – for declaratory policy and capability requirements. 
Preventing major-power war remains a central objective of efforts in 
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